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While others have examined the implementation and/or the stringency of 
enforcement of antitrust laws in post-socialist economies, this paper is the first 
study that attempts to explain the determinants of antitrust enforcement 
activity across post-socialist countries using economic and political variables. 
Using a panel of ten European post-socialist countries over periods ranging 
from 4 to 11 years, we find a number of significant determinants of 
enforcement in these countries.  For example, larger economies engage in more 
antitrust enforcement, and countries have tended to increase their enforcement 
efforts over time. Our results also suggest that countries characterized by more 
unionization and less corruption tend to engage in greater antitrust 
enforcement of all types.  Countries more successful in privatizing have filed 
fewer cases, while more affluent or developed countries investigate fewer cases 
of all types, consistent with an income-shifting motivation for antitrust.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
  There is a large literature exploring determinants of antitrust enforcement in the 
United States, the vast majority of these based on aggregate federal enforcement data 
over time (exploring cyclical influences) or cross-industry studies, usually for a single 
year or aggregated over several years.  Less well-explored is the explanation of European 
antitrust (or competition) policy; no systematic econometric investigation of patterns of 
enforcement in the new antitrust regimes of Central and Eastern Europe has been 
undertaken.   
  Soon after the transition of Central and Eastern European economies from central 
planning to democratic, market-oriented nations, there was no shortage of suggestions by 
American economists as to how these countries should structure their institutions aimed 
at establishing and maintaining competitive markets.
1  At this point, fifteen years since 
most have created antitrust or competition authorities, it is worth looking back and 
exploring the economic and political determinants of the enforcement which emerged.  In 
what follows, we explain antitrust enforcement across ten European post-socialist
2 
countries and varying numbers of years (on average, seven) between the mid-1990s and 
2007 (or earlier for countries which have joined the EU).  The countries have been 
chosen in part due to availability of data, but reflect the major economies of the region.
3  
A pure public interest perspective predicts antitrust activity as a response to monopoly 
                                                 
*We thank Viktorija Aleksiene,Kamila Acholonu-Boruc, Stan Vornivitsky, and Adina Tatar for their help 
in obtaining information on numbers of antitrust cases investigated. 
 
1 See, for just a few examples, Godek (1992), Pittman (1992), Ordover et al. (1994), and Feinberg and 
Meurs (1994). 
2 By this term we mean both post-Soviet republics and countries more generally thought of as part of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
3 These are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, and Ukraine.  We have excluded countries of Central Asia and Russia and the Caucuses. 2 
 
and cartel welfare losses, while more modern economic theories of regulation focus on 
political variables and the extent to which cyclical patterns influence enforcement activity 
through their impact on the interests of affected parties.  We consider a variety of 
political and economic rationales in the analysis below. 
II.  Previous Literature on Determinants of Antitrust Enforcement
4 
 
  As discussed in Ghosal and Gallo (2001), there are two commonly cited 
justifications for antitrust enforcement.  First, antitrust laws may be used to correct for 
deviations from competitive behavior; these corrections increase consumer welfare at the 
expense of producers, with potential gains in welfare to society.  Second, interest groups 
may lobby for antitrust enforcement to redistribute wealth from one group (producers) to 
another (consumers or other – perhaps less efficient -- producers); in this case, the net 
impact on society is more likely to be negative. 
Besanko and Spulber (1989) and Harrington (2004) have provided theoretical 
models of optimal enforcement, with the former focusing on enforcement costs and the 
need to “tolerate” some cartel activity given asymmetric information on production costs, 
and the latter noting that antitrust enforcement/detection will likely be a function of price 
changes (suggesting some perverse incentives enforcement provides to cartels).  Previous 
empirical literature has explored the determinants of antitrust enforcement for the U.S. at 
the federal level, either over time or across industries (generally not both).   For example, 
Long et al. (1973) examined 20 2-digit SIC industries and found industry sales to be the 
most important economic factor explaining antitrust filings, with a lesser influence of 
                                                 
4 Note that we do not discuss here the large literature, both for the U.S. and Europe, on the deterrent impact 
of antitrust enforcement on company behavior. 3 
 
measures proxying for actual or potential monopoly power (such as profit margins, seller 
concentration, and estimated deadweight losses).   
Siegfried (1975) disaggregated the analysis a bit to 65 IRS “minor industries” and 
concluded that economic variables generally seem to have little influence on Antitrust 
Division enforcement activity; while an estimate of welfare loss (in some specifications) 
did have a positive impact on case filing activity, this disappeared when differing sizes of 
industries (measured by numbers of firms) were controlled for.  Market concentration (in 
some specifications) had the expected positive impact on antitrust cases, but even here 
the economic variables had a very low level of explanatory power, and generally 
speaking, results were quite sensitive to specification and measurement issues.
5  Both 
Masson and Reynolds (1977) and Pittman (1992) point out flaws in these studies, both in 
statistical analysis/data measurement and in interpretation.  In particular, appropriate 
economic market definitions are far narrower than what is incorporated in the previous 
econometric work, cases brought by the US Federal Trade Commission (which shares 
antitrust enforcement responsibility with the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division) 
are excluded, and both deadweight losses and economic profits are likely measured in 
error.  Perhaps most importantly, a rational antitrust enforcer might pursue cases with a 
smaller static welfare loss so as to reduce the costs of victory and to provide deterrence 
and precedent value in the future. 
Ghosal and Gallo (2001) performed a time series analysis over 40 years of annual 
data and found that antitrust enforcement by the U.S. Department of Justice is 
countercyclical.  The authors speculate that this is because antitrust violations increase 
                                                 
5 Siegfried (1975) also found some evidence suggesting a reverse causalilty problem in the earlier work, in 
that measured welfare losses seemed more closely related to past case filing activity.   4 
 
during periods of declining economic activity (as firms are more desperate to maintain 
profit levels).     
All studies note that political motivations obviously may play a role in 
enforcement (this is emphasized by Wood and Anderson (1993)).  Empirical studies of 
the national level of antitrust enforcement such as Areeda (1994) and Ghosal and Gallo 
(2001) have investigated whether antitrust enforcement increases under Democratic 
administrations, with mixed results.
6  Feinberg and Reynolds (2009) examine variation 
across U.S. states in antitrust enforcement over the 1992-2006 period, finding both 
economic and political determinants to play a role -- case filings tend to be 
countercyclical, influenced by the political party of the state’s governor, and positively 
related to a state’s economic size and relative role of government in the economy.  
For Europe, Carree et al. (2009) provide an analysis, largely descriptive, of 
European Union antitrust enforcement – with some results hinting at the lack of political 
bias or non-EU-member bias; they also provide a brief discussion of the limited prior 
literature explaining European merger control (e.g., Duso et al. (2007)) and individual 
member country antitrust enforcement.  Of the latter, Davies et al. (1999) find that market 
shares predict well UK antimonopoly enforcement success, and Lauk (2003) obtains 
similar results for German antitrust enforcement.  
The patterns of European post-socialist antitrust enforcement have been less-
studied, though Pittman (2004) examined some data on antimonopoly usage in those 
countries and Holscher and Stephan (2004) – focusing on early EU-candidate nations in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – provide some descriptive discussion of national 
                                                 
6 Pittman (1992) also presents mixed results on political influence (via campaign contributions) on U.S. 
antitrust enforcement. 5 
 
antitrust/competition laws and enforcement.  Others have examined the related issue of 
patterns of implementation of competition laws in transition economies; these include 
Fingleton et al. (1996) and Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000).
7   
III.  Antitrust Institutions in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
Countries emerged from socialism with production structures characterized by 
very large firms, designed to fully serve specific local or national markets.  These firms 
were also highly vertically integrated (Feinberg and Meurs, 1994).  Early post-socialist 
reforms thus typically included anti-monopoly legislation.  Poland introduced the initial 
anti-monopoly legislation during the economic crisis that preceded the collapse of 
socialism (1987), while most other countries in this study implemented legislation soon 
after the collapse, between 1990 and 1992 (Dutz and Vagliasindi, 2000).
8  The early laws 
were modeled closely on EU competition policy, especially Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty of Rome (Pittman, 1998).  Still, the early legislation suffered from some 
significant weaknesses, particularly the lack of a clear distinction between horizontal and 
vertical agreements and a lack of guidance regarding how to define relevant markets and, 
relatedly, an overly simple approach to defining market dominance (Pittman, 1998; 
Boner and Kovacic, 1997-1998).   
EU accession countries implemented amendments as part of the accession 
agreements, bringing their policy more closely into line with EU competition law.  These 
amendments to a large extent reduced the weaknesses outlined in Pittman (1998).  All 
countries in our sample except Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia and Ukraine became EU 
                                                 
7 Fingleton et al (1996) focus on the experience of just four major countries (Hungary, Poland, Czech and 
Slovak Republics), while Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000) examine 22 economies and  test for (and find) a  
positive relationship between implementation of competition policy and a measure of the intensity of 
market competition in these economies. 
8 Romania implemented its legislation in 1996, Croatia in 1995. 6 
 
members in 2004 and implemented the amendments to competition policy in the mid- to 
late-1990s, during accession negotiations.  Bulgaria and Romania joined in 2007; 
Bulgaria amended competition policy in 1998, whereas Romania, which adopted its 
initial legislation only in 1996, was not required to implement reforms prior to 
integration.   
Croatia and Ukraine have not yet joined the EU, and may thus have policy less 
closely aligned with Western standards.  Ukraine made important amendments to its early 
competition policy in 1994, drawing heavily on Western and EU anti-trust law, but the 
amended legislation left many issues more broadly or simply defined than comparable 
EU legislation.  Boner and Kovacic’s (1997-1998) analysis of Ukraine’s competition 
policy in 1997 found that Ukraine continued to rely heavily on simple (“per se”) 
measures of market power, which seemed to contribute to high levels of anti-trust 
activity.  The authors argue that a weak judicial system leaves anti-trust cases open to 
political manipulation, as courts have not effectively reviewed outcomes.  Further 
potential for politicization of anti-trust policy derives from the significant role the state 
and ministries continue to play in owning and influencing enterprises in Ukraine 
(Stotykia, 2006).  The state may thus face conflicting motives with respect to monitoring 
the behavior of these enterprises.  Further amendments in 2002 allowed for more 
consideration of the degree of competition in markets (beyond simple market share), but 
possibly increased political manipulation of anti-trust actions, giving Ministries the 
ability to over-ride competition agency decisions related to firms under their control 
(Stotyka, 2006). 7 
 
In the countries under consideration here, most major legislation was in place by 
2000.  The EBRD Competition Policy Indicator suggests little change in policy or 
enforcement over the period 2000-2007.  On a scale from 1 to 4+, no country in our 
sample raised its score by more than one-third of a point (from 2+ to 3-, for example) 
over this period (EBRD Transition Reports 2000-2008, cited in Holscher and Stephan, 
2004).  However, Holscher and Stephan (2009) argue that despite the early establishment 
of competition laws, these laws did not really begin to be enforced until around 2006. 
Holscher and Stephan (2004) found that despite the common basis in EU policy, there 
continues to exist significant legislative differences among EU accession states.  
Enforcement capacity varies significantly between countries, depending on the financial 
resources and skills at their disposal.  Agency staff varies from 11 people in (tiny) 
Slovenia to 346 people in Romania.  Budget per staff member also varies significantly, 
from $4,777 in Romania to $38,962 in Slovenia.   As a share of the national budget, 
Slovakia spends the least, while Lithuania spends twice as much (Nicholson, 2008).  An 
additional issue is whether antimonopoly agencies are independent and able to enforce 
laws independently of political pressures.   
There have been a number of attempts to evaluate and compare the overall 
comprehensiveness and effectiveness of these anti-trust policies.  Results of the main 
studies are presented in Table 1.  These studies suggest that significant variation exists 
between countries in the level of regulation and enforcement of anti-trust issues, but they 
do not produce a consistent ranking of anti-trust policy, nor do they seek to explain these 
differences as we attempt in what follows.   8 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 present the results from a survey conducted by the 
World Economic Forum of business leaders in 2001, which asked them to rank anti-trust 
policy between lax (1) and effectively promoting competition (7).  Hungary and Poland 
rank at the top of this measure, but Lithuania joins Ukraine at the bottom (Holscher and 
Stephan, 2009).  Bulgaria and Croatia were not ranked in this survey. 
Two other measures of antitrust activity are based on EBRD data.  A survey done 
in 1999 based on data from 1996-1997 and measuring enforcement and advocacy (not 
legislation itself), finds Poland, Hungary and Lithuania to have the most effective anti-
trust implementation, and Ukraine and Croatia to have the weakest (Dutz and Vigliasindi, 
2000).   
The EBRD Competition Policy Indicator, which measures both legislation and 
enforcement (Holscher and Stephan, 2009; EBRD, 2004), covers all years included in our 
survey (1995-2008).   On average for the whole period, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia 
are at the top.  Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine are at the bottom. 
Finally, Hylton and Deng (2006) examine competition laws in 102 countries, 
looking specifically at the categories of Territorial Scope, Remedies, Private 
Enforcement, Merger Notification, Merger Assessment, Dominance and Restrictive 
Trade Practices for the period January 2001-December 2004.  Scores range from 25 
(Australia, with the most comprehensive legal basis for anti-trust legislation) to 2 
(Paraguay, with apparently almost no legal basis for such legislation).   As can be seen 
from Table 1, the former socialist countries in our sample are significantly bunched 
around 20.  Hungary is found to have the most comprehensive legislation, earning a 24, 
while Bulgaria has the least comprehensive, earning a 17.  Ukraine, which does not rank 9 
 
near the top of other anti-trust policy rankings, is found to have very comprehensive 
legislation, ranking second. 
IV.  Data and Econometric Specification 
 
  As noted above, previous rankings of the strength of antitrust enforcement in our 
sample of ten post-socialist countries are not completely consistent.  We take a different 
approach here, examining patterns of their case filings and explaining these by economic 
and political variables.   
Eight of the ten countries we study here have by now joined the European Union, 
which means their antitrust enforcement (at the country level) is now somewhat more 
akin to that of individual states in the US; for this reason we include only data points 
through the year prior to EU accession.  As a result, our sample period ends in 2003 for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; in 2006 for 
Bulgaria and Romania; and in 2007 for Croatia and Ukraine (not due to accession, rather 
simply for data availability reasons).  The start date for observations varies and depends 
on availability of competition/antitrust case information.  Antitrust case information was 
obtained from competition agency websites, including the annual reports provided there, 
as well as additional enforcement data provided by staff at some of the agencies.  In total 
our analysis is based on 71 data points.  Table 2 reports the sample sizes by country. 
   The case data are broken down into (1) abuse of dominance (or monopolization) 
cases; (2) prohibited agreements (mostly cartel-type, price-fixing agreements); and (3) 
concentrations (or merger) investigations, as well as the total of these.  The latter of these 
categories often reflects total merger activity in the country rather than a choice by the 
agency towards enforcement, and it will be of interest to see if determinants of this type 10 
 
of enforcement activity differ from those of the first two (generally more discretionary) 
categories. 
  Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the differences in total antitrust enforcement activity by 
country and over time.  The average number of antitrust cases varies significantly across 
the countries in our sample, ranging from 58 per year in Slovenia to 948 in the Ukraine 
and 1,230 in Poland.  These summary statistics do not seem to reflect the results from 
many of the studies described in Section III.  For example, the 1999 EBRD survey which 
measured antitrust enforcement activity ranked Poland as having some of the most 
effective antitrust legislation, but the Ukraine as having some of the weakest (though, as 
noted by Hylton and Deng (2006), Ukraine’s laws are among the most comprehensive in 
coverage).  Part of this discrepancy could be explained by the various sample periods of 
the surveys described in Section III and the significant variation in antitrust enforcement 
over our sample period, as illustrated in Figure 2.  Poland, for example, experienced a 
150 percent decrease in total antitrust enforcement activity between 1998 and 2003.  In 
contrast, the Ukraine experienced an increase of 54 percent between 2003 and 2007.       
  We attempt to estimate the determinants of the variation in antitrust enforcement 
across countries and years using a fixed-effects panel regression model.    As in most 
panel data of this nature, it is important to control for potential unobserved heterogeneity 
across countries.  In other words, there are likely to be unobserved characteristics 
associated with each country that impact the level of enforcement over all years in the 
sample.  This unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled as either a fixed effect or a 
random variable that follows some known distribution.  Although random effects can be 
more efficient in some cases, if the unobserved component is correlated with the 11 
 
explanatory variables, use of the random effects model will result in biased coefficient 
estimates.  Hausman tests suggest in this case that random effects are inappropriate. 
Unfortunately, inclusion of fixed effects in panel regressions prevents the 
estimation of time-invariant variables—those country-specific variables that do not vary 
over time.  It also makes it difficult to identify the impact of those variables that do not 
vary much over time.  Therefore, in other specifications we estimate our model using the 
fixed effects vector decomposition estimator developed in Plumber and Troeger (2007).   
While details and the statistical properties of the estimator can be found there, intuitively, 
parameters of the model are estimated in three stages.  The first stage estimates a pure 
fixed effects model.  The second stage decomposes the fixed effects vector into a part 
explained by the time-invariant (or almost time-invariant) variables and an error term.  
Finally, the third stage re-estimates the original model by pooled OLS, but includes the 
time-invariant variables and the error term of the second stage in place of the fixed 
effects.  The estimator allows for the inclusion of time-invariant and nearly time-invariant 
parameters.   
We include a wide variety of explanatory variables that reflect the potential 
economic and political influences on enforcement.  For example, we expect countries 
with larger economies to engage in more antitrust enforcement; we therefore include a 
measure of market size, Gross National Income (GNI).  One theory of antitrust 
enforcement speculates that enforcement may be a method of allowing government 
agencies to redistribute wealth from producers to consumers.  If this is the case, one 
might expect antitrust enforcement to decrease as the country becomes more developed 
and feels less of a need to redistribute wealth to its low income consumers; we include 12 
 
the country’s GNI per Capita to account for this possibility.  To control for the likelihood 
that antitrust enforcement is related to aggregate economic activity and business cycles, 
as suggested by Ghosal and Gallo (2001), we include the country’s annual GDP growth 
rate.  All three variables are from World Development Indicators.
9   
  To account for the possibility that unions may enact pressure on officials to secure 
antitrust enforcement on particular firms, we include estimates of union membership rates 
(Estimated Unionization Rate).
10  For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, this variable was taken from unpublished estimates by Lucio 
Baccaro based on survey data collected by Jelle Visser.
11.  In the case of Bulgaria and 
Romania, we use International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates published in their 
World Labour Report 1997-1998 for a period around 1995 and extrapolate the later years 
based on the time trend patterns observed for the six countries included in the Baccaro 
estimates.  We estimate the unionization rate in Croatia and the Ukraine in a similar 
manner using recent membership data from the Federation of European Employers (and 
labor force figures from the CIA World Factbook), and then extrapolating backwards 
using the same time trend pattern. 
Two of the components of the Economic Freedom Index compiled by the 
Heritage Foundation may explain some of the variation in antitrust activity across CEE 
countries.  Countries with larger governments may engage in more antitrust enforcement 
for a number of reasons.  First, such states may have more financial resources available 
with which to pursue antitrust matters.  States with larger governments may also tend to 
                                                 
9 Results from specifications that utilize the country’s unemployment rate in place of its GDP growth rate 
were not qualitatively different from those presented here.  
10 It is also possible, however, that unions may share monopoly rents with large employers and support 
them in opposing antitrust activity. 
11 The authors thank Lucio Baccaro for providing this information. 13 
 
be more interventionist in general.  We include a measure of the size of the government 
role in the economy, the Government Spending Index, from the Heritage Foundation.  
The second component, the Freedom from Corruption Index measures the perceived level 
of public sector corruption in the country.  It is not immediately apparent what impact 
public sector corruption would have on antitrust enforcement.  On one hand, corrupt 
government officials may pursue more antitrust cases in order to secure payoffs from 
firms.  On the other hand, firms may be able to pay off government officials in corrupt 
governments to avoid antitrust action.  Both indices range from 0 to 100. 
Countries in which a high proportion of enterprises are controlled by the public 
sector would seem to have little need or motivation to engage in antitrust activity; 
however, these government-controlled firms may encourage antitrust enforcers to pursue 
their private sector rivals.  To account for variation in the degree of transition in the CEE 
countries in our sample, we include the Large Scale Privatization Index compiled by the 
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).  This index ranges from 0 
to 4.
12     
Finally, we include (to control for differing experience with antitrust) the time 
since first adoption of antitrust laws (Years Since Adoption), from Dutz and Vagliasindi 
(2000).  In specifications using time-invariant variables we also include a measure of the 
degree of market competition in the economy.  Specifically, the variable Share with <=3 
Competitors is the share of firms reporting that they had 3 or fewer competitors from the 
                                                 
12 Countries are assigned a “1” if  there is little private ownership, “2” if there is a  comprehensive scheme 
almost ready for implementation and some sales completed, “3” if more than 25 per cent of large-scale 
enterprise assets are in private hands or in the process of being privatized, and a “4” if more than 50 percent 
of state-owned enterprise and farm assets are in private ownership.  14 
 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey.  The World Bank and EBRD 
conducted this survey of over 4,000 firms in 22 transition countries in 1999-2000.    




Results from the estimation of the fixed effects panel regression model are 
included in Table 4.  All variables were logged prior to estimation, thus the estimates 
represent elasticities.   
Column 1 of Table 4 presents the impact of the explanatory variables on the total 
number of antitrust enforcement cases conducted in a specific country in a given year.  Of 
those variables proposed in Section IV, only three prove to be statistically significant.  
Countries appear to be more likely to engage in antitrust enforcement activity the higher 
the unionization rate in the country, suggesting that unions may be able to put pressure on 
governments to take actions against specific firms.  Specifically, a 1 percent increase in 
the level of unionization increases antitrust enforcement activity by 1.4 percent in a given 
year.  Countries also engage in more antitrust actions the less corrupt their public sector.  
The parameter estimates indicate that a 1 percent increase in the Freedom from 
Corruption index increases enforcement activity by 1.8 percent.  The results suggest that 
corrupt officials may be willing to overlook antitrust activities at the request of domestic 
firms.  Finally, the estimates suggest that on average countries have chosen to engage in 
more antitrust activity over time. 
Results in Columns 2-4 of Table 4 suggest that there may be some interesting 
differences in the determinants of specific types of antitrust enforcement.  For example, 15 
 
the unionization rate has a statistically significant impact only on the number of merger 
cases undertaken by country, not on discretionary cases such as those involving 
monopolization or illegal agreements.  Contrary to the discussion above, this result 
suggests that unions don’t necessarily impose pressure on governments to undertake 
antitrust actions; the positive impact on merger enforcement may simply reflect a 
correlation between union density and merger activity in the economy. 
Interestingly, the parameter estimates suggest that countries engage in fewer 
illegal agreement cases as they privatize more of their sectors.  Specifically, a one percent 
increase in the privatization index reduces the number of illegal agreement cases by 7.8 
percent.  This may suggest that public or pseudo-public entities may engage in more 
illegal activities, or these entities may pressure antitrust enforcement officials to pursue 
more illegal activities by their private competitors.   
Abuse of dominance (or monopolization) cases seem to be the only type of 
antitrust case related to business cycles.  The estimates suggest that a 1 percent increase 
in a country’s GDP growth rate results in a 10.8 percent increase in abuse of dominance 
cases undertaken by countries.  Note that this result is contrary to the result in Ghosal and 
Gallo (2001), who found that antitrust enforcement activity was counter-cyclical in the 
United States.  Abuse of dominance cases are also not statistically significantly impacted 
by the corruption levels in the country. 
  In order to better estimate the impact of time-invariant and nearly time-invariant 
variables, Table 5 presents the results of the fixed effects vector decomposition model.  
The results from those variables with significant time-variation are not qualitatively 
different from those presented in Table 4.  However, a number of those nearly time-16 
 
invariant variables that were insignificant in the fixed effect model prove to be 
statistically significant when estimated using the vector decomposition model. 
Specifically, results suggest that countries that have undertaken more privatization 
engage in less antitrust enforcement activity (the exception being prohibited agreement 
cases).  Not surprisingly, countries with larger economies as measured by the Gross 
National Income engage in more of all forms of antitrust enforcement, while more 
developed countries, as measured by the GNI per capita, engage in less of all forms of 
antitrust enforcement activity.  Assuming that less developed countries have significantly 
more low-income consumers than more developed countries, this result seems to support 
theoretical models that suggest that countries may use antitrust enforcement to transfer 
welfare from firms to low-income consumers.  
Finally, the fixed effects vector decomposition model allows us to include one 
additional time-invariant variable, the share of firms in each country reporting that they 
had 3 or fewer competitors in 1999.  Not surprisingly, estimates suggest that the more 
concentrated industries are in a country, the more cartel-type cases a country pursues.  
Specifically, a 1 percent increase in the share of firms with 3 of fewer competitors 
increases the number of illegal agreement cases by 3.0 percent; increased market 
concentration may lead to a greater number of attempts at collusive activity, some of 
which are then detected by the authorities.  In contrast, countries with more concentrated 
industries engage in fewer merger cases, which may be due to the fact that their industries 
are already highly concentrated because the merger activity took place prior to our 
sample period. 




  While others have examined the implementation of antitrust/competition laws in 
post-socialist economies in the 1990s, and have evaluated the stringency of their 
enforcement, no previous study has attempted to explain this enforcement activity in 
terms of economic and political variables.  Our results are somewhat preliminary given 
the limitations of available data, but some findings are quite interesting.  Not surprisingly, 
larger economies and those with antitrust laws adopted earlier bring more cases. While 
not always statistically significant, both more unionization and less corruption are 
associated with greater antitrust enforcement of all types. 
Countries more successful in privatizing have filed fewer cases – perhaps because 
newly privatized firms pursue more competitive behavior than government-owned or 
quasi-public firms, or because governments with fewer state-holdings are less likely to be 
pressured to go after their private competitors. The business cycle seems not to have a 
major impact on case-filing activity, and neither does the relative size of government in 
the economy.  More affluent or developed countries investigate fewer cases of all types, 
consistent with an income-shifting motivation for antitrust.  However, the more 
traditional welfare loss argument for antitrust activity is supported in the finding that 
economies with more concentrated industries bring more cases against horizontal (cartel-
type) agreements. 
What would be useful in future work in this area is the disaggregation of antitrust 
cases by industry focus, along with measures of success in antitrust enforcement (rather 
than simply cases investigated as examined here).  Comparing the patterns found here to 
what has transpired after EU accession would be of interest as well.  Nevertheless, we 18 
 
have found that while political pressures – related to union and state ownership -- may 
have influenced competition policy enforcement in the post-socialist economies, 
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 Hylton & Deng 
 (2001)  (1999)  (1995-2007)  (2001-2004) 
 Score  Rank  Score Rank Score Rank Score  Rank
Bulgaria        4.6 5 2.34 8 17  10
Croatia        3.8 8(tie) 2.21 10 19  6(tie)
Czech Rep  3.7  5(tie)  4.5 6 2.98 4 19  6(tie)
Hungary 4.8  1  5.9 2 3.12 1 24  1
Lithuania 3.4  7  5.8 3 2.71 5 21  4
Poland 4.6  2  6.2 1 3.05 2(tie)  19  6(tie)
Romania 3.7  5(tie)  5 4 2.16 9 22  3
Slovakia 3.8  4     3.05 2(tie)  19  6(tie)
Slovenia 4.2  3  3.8 8(tie) 2.48 6 20  5





Sample Years and Number of Observations by Country 
  Sample Years  Number of Observations 
Bulgaria 2001-2006  6 
Croatia     1997-2007  11 
Czech Republic    1995-2003  9 
Hungary     1997-2003  7 
Lithuania     1995-2003  9 
Poland      1998-2003  6 
Romania 1997-2006  10 
Slovakia     2000-2003  4 
Slovenia     2000-2003  4 





Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Antitrust Measures       
Total Cases  306.83  428.37  13.00  2,170.00
Abuse of Dominance Cases  55.10  116.62  1.00  547.00
Prohibited Agreement Cases  49.55  90.60  0.00  534.00
Merger Cases  168.27  312.43  5.00  1,872.00
      
Explanatory Variables      
Estimated Unionization Rate  0.27  0.09  0.11  0.48
Government Spending Index  48.11  17.57  2.90  79.70
Freedom from Corruption Index  40.27  10.01  21.00  60.00
Large Scale Privatization Index  3.45  0.45  2.70  4.00
Gross National Income (Billions)  58.30  62.01  7.53  376.27
GNI per Capita  5,535.69  4,056.61  700.00  21,510.00
GDP Growth Rate  0.04  0.03  -0.06  0.12




Determinants of Antitrust Activity (Fixed Effects Model)* 









Estimated Unionization Rate  1.43**  0.27  0.93  2.32** 
 (1.99)  (0.30)  (0.69)  (3.43) 
Government Spending Index  0.09  -0.07  -0.05  0.06 
 (0.43)  (-0.30)  (0.34)  (0.19) 
Freedom from Corruption   1.85**  0.48  3.50**  1.23** 
   Index  (3.35)  (0.80)  (3.94)  (2.39) 
Large Scale Privatization   -3.28  -2.45  -7.87**  -3.15 
   Index  (-1.51)  (-1.02)  (-2.25)  (-1.55) 
Gross National Income   5.02  1.42  -2.09  5.76 
 (0.38)  (0.10)  (-0.10)  (0.47) 
GNI per Capita  -5.78  -1.72  0.87  -6.31 
 (-0.45)  (-0.12)  (0.04)  (-0.52) 
GDP Growth Rate  -0.92  10.87**  5.01  -1.33 
 (-0.27)  (2.85)  (0.91)  (-0.42) 
Years Since Adoption   1.97**  0.07  1.77**  2.63** 
 (4.60)  (0.50)  (2.42)  (6.55) 
        
σi  4.62 1.21  2.91  5.54 
σit 0.51  0.55  0.80  0.47 
Ρ 0.98  0.83  0.92  0.99 
        
No. of Observations  66  60  60  65 
Overall R-Squared  0.58  0.32  0.16  0.57 
* Parameter estimates from fixed effects panel regression model.  All variables estimated 
in logs.  Estimates from constant not reported.  t-statistics in parentheses.  *, ** indicate 
those elasticities significant at the 10 and 5 percent levels. 26 
 
Table 5 
Determinants of Antitrust Activity (Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition)* 









Estimated Unionization Rate  1.48**  0.37  0.64  2.51** 
 (4.91)  (1.44)  (1.45)  (7.67) 
Government Spending Index  0.11  -0.06  -0.04  0.09 
 (0.69)  (-0.34)  (-0.16)  (0.65) 
Freedom from Corruption   1.76**  0.53  3.30**  1.09** 
   Index  (3.84)  (1.05)  (4.32)  (2.64) 
Large Scale Privatization   -4.52**  -1.35*  -1.72  -5.14** 
   Index  (-6.80)  (-1.85)  (-1.53)  (-7.65) 
Gross National Income   0.83**  0.97**  1.11**  0.37** 
 (0.12)  (7.07)  (5.22)  (2.97) 
GNI per Capita  -0.99**  -0.83**  -1.53**  -0.64** 
 (-4.87)  (-3.67)  (4.58)  (-3.31) 
GDP Growth Rate  -0.95  11.37**  4.48  -2.02 
 (-0.37)  (3.88)  (0.99)  (-0.83) 
Years Since Adoption   1.97**  0.17  1.52**  2.69** 
 (8.04)  (0.78)  (3.91)  (10.64) 
Share of Firms Reporting  0.01  -0.08  3.09**  -1.04** 
  3 or Fewer Competitors  (0.04)  (-0.22)  (5.31)  (-3.37) 
σi 1.00**  1.00**  1.00**  1.00** 
 (7.83)  (12.42)  (5.53)  (9.26) 
        
No. of Observations  70  63  63  70 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.82  0.85  0.64  0.85 
* Parameter estimates from a fixed effects vector decomposition model.  All variables 
estimated in logs.  Estimates from constant not reported.  t-statistics in parentheses.  *, ** 
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